[RECOMMENDATION BY RESOLUTION - VOTED] East Pacific Attorney Office

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Would it be solely this test that appoints an Attorney, or would it be in charge of the Delegate, the Magisterium, and/or the Conclave, provided they got all the answers correct?

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The Viceroy appoints Attorneys, as outlined in Article II, Section 1:

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1. The Viceroy shall appoint several Attorneys from the Citizenry of the East Pacific, subject to the below regulations:
…1.A Arbiters shall be ineligible for the position of Attorney, to prevent confusion over the question of Arbiter votes on final decisions;
…1.B Magisters shall be ineligible for the position of Attorney, to preserve the independence of the Conclave from possible legislative interference;
…1.C The Delegate shall be ineligible for the position of Attorney, to preserve the independence of the Conclave from possible Executive interference;
…1.D All appointed Attorneys must be able to pass a basic test on East Pacifican law, including questions on the Concordat, formulated by the Conclave;

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It’s strictly at their discretion, but now that I look at it, nothing here stops a Viceroy from denying the bar to anyone for political reasons, even though they passed the test, or from appointing someone hopelessly incompetent at law for much the same reason. Maybe the test results ought to be shown to the rest of the Arbiters, who would then vote on it.

I should start by saying I approve of the intent of this resolution but want to ensure it would not be abused.

Besides ethics, what would prevent the Viceroy from falsifying test results?

I suppose that proving decisively that the Viceroy (or whoever else is in charge of analyzing the tests) isn’t falsifying it would be difficult in any case. However, our Viceroy is supposed to be someone of unimpeachable conduct; anyone who would falsify test results obviously doesn’t qualify, and it would be easy to tell once the unqualified attorney began their work.

That’s what I meant by “besides ethics”: I know the Viceroy is supposed to be someone of unimpeachable conduct but the key word in your response and mine is “supposed to.” Matters in the executive in October didn’t go as they were supposed to; it is not hard to imagine a future judiciary not doing what they are supposed to.

What do you think about explicitly providing a clause for removal due to incompetence?

A Removal Clause does sound like a good idea, and I should have included that from the beginning. I’ll add that soon.

EDIT: Done.

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  1. If the Viceroy’s vote is counted in a unanimous decision, then their bad attorney can never be taken down.

  2. If the Viceroy’s vote doesn’t count in a unanimous decision, then still all it takes is one bad apple to spoil the bunch.

  3. Bringing back up Abadong’s point, we can work to something along the lines of “Any Attorney that is currently a defendant in a criminal case or is deemed questionable by any Arbiter may be suspended up until a Conclave ruling proves them innocent of crimes and fit for duty.” Or something like that.

  4. Down the rabbit hole of mistrust, however, the issue of Arbiters’ integrity is questioned, and the potential issue of repeated questionability rulings could knock the Attorney out of action for a long time. Of course, we could introduce evidence, yadda yadda yadda, and make this process more difficult in exchange for protected against untrustworthiness.

  5. While I don’t have major objections to this system due to trust in our Conclave, I thought I should point this out to contribute my thoughts should this become required.

That is all.

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Would it be solely this test that appoints an Attorney, or would it be in charge of the Delegate, the Magisterium, and/or the Conclave, provided they got all the answers correct?

— End quote

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The Viceroy appoints Attorneys, as outlined in Article II, Section 1:

— Begin quote from ____

1. The Viceroy shall appoint several Attorneys from the Citizenry of the East Pacific, subject to the below regulations:
…1.A Arbiters shall be ineligible for the position of Attorney, to prevent confusion over the question of Arbiter votes on final decisions;
…1.B Magisters shall be ineligible for the position of Attorney, to preserve the independence of the Conclave from possible legislative interference;
…1.C The Delegate shall be ineligible for the position of Attorney, to preserve the independence of the Conclave from possible Executive interference;
…1.D All appointed Attorneys must be able to pass a basic test on East Pacifican law, including questions on the Concordat, formulated by the Conclave;

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It’s strictly at their discretion, but now that I look at it, nothing here stops a Viceroy from denying the bar to anyone for political reasons, even though they passed the test, or from appointing someone hopelessly incompetent at law for much the same reason. Maybe the test results ought to be shown to the rest of the Arbiters, who would then vote on it.

I should start by saying I approve of the intent of this resolution but want to ensure it would not be abused.

Besides ethics, what would prevent the Viceroy from falsifying test results?

I suppose that proving decisively that the Viceroy (or whoever else is in charge of analyzing the tests) isn’t falsifying it would be difficult in any case. However, our Viceroy is supposed to be someone of unimpeachable conduct; anyone who would falsify test results obviously doesn’t qualify, and it would be easy to tell once the unqualified attorney began their work.

That’s what I meant by “besides ethics”: I know the Viceroy is supposed to be someone of unimpeachable conduct but the key word in your response and mine is “supposed to.” Matters in the executive in October didn’t go as they were supposed to; it is not hard to imagine a future judiciary not doing what they are supposed to.

What do you think about explicitly providing a clause for removal due to incompetence?

A Removal Clause does sound like a good idea, and I should have included that from the beginning. I’ll add that soon.

EDIT: Done.

  1. If the Viceroy’s vote is counted in a unanimous decision, then their bad attorney can never be taken down.

  2. If the Viceroy’s vote doesn’t count in a unanimous decision, then still all it takes is one bad apple to spoil the bunch.

  3. Bringing back up Abadong’s point, we can work to something along the lines of “Any Attorney that is currently a defendant in a criminal case or is deemed questionable by any Arbiter may be suspended up until a Conclave ruling proves them innocent of crimes and fit for duty.” Or something like that.

  4. Down the rabbit hole of mistrust, however, the issue of Arbiters’ integrity is questioned, and the potential issue of repeated questionability rulings could knock the Attorney out of action for a long time. Of course, we could introduce evidence, yadda yadda yadda, and make this process more difficult in exchange for protected against untrustworthiness.

  5. While I don’t have major objections to this system due to trust in our Conclave, I thought I should point this out to contribute my thoughts should this become required.

That is all.

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1 and 2. What about changing it to at least 3/4 for removal? And/or having a clause V.2 that puts it in the hands of the legislature or executive?

  1. Definitely something along those lines. But how would you define “questionable”?

4 and 5. I’m simply applying this approach:
“Science may seem to challenge the comfortable power assumptions of other institutions, simply by subjecting them to detached scrutiny. Organized skepticism involves a latent questioning of certain bases of established routine, authority, [and] vested procedures” (https://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/students/envs_5110/merton_sociology_science.pdf).
That includes skepticism about my own devil’s advocacy.
Trust is delicate and the environment, in the short run, is a prime determinant of how much people trust each other (https://ncase.me/trust/). If we put such protections into the environment, we are implying we need them in the first place, and we may be undermining trust in the short run.

However, in the long run, it’s the people that determine the environment. It’s up in the air as to how we as a community define objectivity and where responsibility ultimately lies.

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Would it be solely this test that appoints an Attorney, or would it be in charge of the Delegate, the Magisterium, and/or the Conclave, provided they got all the answers correct?

— End quote

— End quote

— End quote

— End quote

— End quote

— End quote

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The Viceroy appoints Attorneys, as outlined in Article II, Section 1:

— Begin quote from ____

1. The Viceroy shall appoint several Attorneys from the Citizenry of the East Pacific, subject to the below regulations:
…1.A Arbiters shall be ineligible for the position of Attorney, to prevent confusion over the question of Arbiter votes on final decisions;
…1.B Magisters shall be ineligible for the position of Attorney, to preserve the independence of the Conclave from possible legislative interference;
…1.C The Delegate shall be ineligible for the position of Attorney, to preserve the independence of the Conclave from possible Executive interference;
…1.D All appointed Attorneys must be able to pass a basic test on East Pacifican law, including questions on the Concordat, formulated by the Conclave;

— End quote

It’s strictly at their discretion, but now that I look at it, nothing here stops a Viceroy from denying the bar to anyone for political reasons, even though they passed the test, or from appointing someone hopelessly incompetent at law for much the same reason. Maybe the test results ought to be shown to the rest of the Arbiters, who would then vote on it.

I should start by saying I approve of the intent of this resolution but want to ensure it would not be abused.

Besides ethics, what would prevent the Viceroy from falsifying test results?

I suppose that proving decisively that the Viceroy (or whoever else is in charge of analyzing the tests) isn’t falsifying it would be difficult in any case. However, our Viceroy is supposed to be someone of unimpeachable conduct; anyone who would falsify test results obviously doesn’t qualify, and it would be easy to tell once the unqualified attorney began their work.

That’s what I meant by “besides ethics”: I know the Viceroy is supposed to be someone of unimpeachable conduct but the key word in your response and mine is “supposed to.” Matters in the executive in October didn’t go as they were supposed to; it is not hard to imagine a future judiciary not doing what they are supposed to.

What do you think about explicitly providing a clause for removal due to incompetence?

A Removal Clause does sound like a good idea, and I should have included that from the beginning. I’ll add that soon.

EDIT: Done.

  1. If the Viceroy’s vote is counted in a unanimous decision, then their bad attorney can never be taken down.

  2. If the Viceroy’s vote doesn’t count in a unanimous decision, then still all it takes is one bad apple to spoil the bunch.

  3. Bringing back up Abadong’s point, we can work to something along the lines of “Any Attorney that is currently a defendant in a criminal case or is deemed questionable by any Arbiter may be suspended up until a Conclave ruling proves them innocent of crimes and fit for duty.” Or something like that.

  4. Down the rabbit hole of mistrust, however, the issue of Arbiters’ integrity is questioned, and the potential issue of repeated questionability rulings could knock the Attorney out of action for a long time. Of course, we could introduce evidence, yadda yadda yadda, and make this process more difficult in exchange for protected against untrustworthiness.

  5. While I don’t have major objections to this system due to trust in our Conclave, I thought I should point this out to contribute my thoughts should this become required.

That is all.

1 and 2. What about changing it to at least 3/4 for removal? And/or having a clause V.2 that puts it in the hands of the legislature or executive?

  1. Definitely something along those lines. But how would you define “questionable”?

4 and 5. I’m simply applying this approach:
“Science may seem to challenge the comfortable power assumptions of other institutions, simply by subjecting them to detached scrutiny. Organized skepticism involves a latent questioning of certain bases of established routine, authority, [and] vested procedures” (https://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/students/envs_5110/merton_sociology_science.pdf).
That includes skepticism about my own devil’s advocacy.
Trust is delicate and the environment, in the short run, is a prime determinant of how much people trust each other (https://ncase.me/trust/). If we put such protections into the environment, we are implying we need them in the first place, and we may be undermining trust in the short run.

However, in the long run, it’s the people that determine the environment. It’s up in the air as to how we as a community define objectivity and where responsibility ultimately lies.

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As for your first comment, I am of the opinion that a unanimous vote makes it of more grave importance, but I’m not entirely opposed to the idea of 3/4 vote. Putting it in the hands of the Magisterium or, especially, the Delegacy is entirely out of the question for me. It’s an internal Conclave affair, and if someone outside the Conclave wishes to provide the Conclave with evidence that some Attorney ought to be removed, they can do so by bringing it to the Viceroy or the Viceroy Designee. For your third point, “questionable” would be up to the discretion of the Arbiter in question.

@Pakitsk @borromeanWhyKnot

I would say questionable merely means if the Arbiter thinks that the Attorney shouldn’t be an Attorney.

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Would it be solely this test that appoints an Attorney, or would it be in charge of the Delegate, the Magisterium, and/or the Conclave, provided they got all the answers correct?

— End quote

— End quote

— End quote

— End quote

— End quote

— End quote

— End quote

— End quote

The Viceroy appoints Attorneys, as outlined in Article II, Section 1:

— Begin quote from ____

1. The Viceroy shall appoint several Attorneys from the Citizenry of the East Pacific, subject to the below regulations:
…1.A Arbiters shall be ineligible for the position of Attorney, to prevent confusion over the question of Arbiter votes on final decisions;
…1.B Magisters shall be ineligible for the position of Attorney, to preserve the independence of the Conclave from possible legislative interference;
…1.C The Delegate shall be ineligible for the position of Attorney, to preserve the independence of the Conclave from possible Executive interference;
…1.D All appointed Attorneys must be able to pass a basic test on East Pacifican law, including questions on the Concordat, formulated by the Conclave;

— End quote

It’s strictly at their discretion, but now that I look at it, nothing here stops a Viceroy from denying the bar to anyone for political reasons, even though they passed the test, or from appointing someone hopelessly incompetent at law for much the same reason. Maybe the test results ought to be shown to the rest of the Arbiters, who would then vote on it.

I should start by saying I approve of the intent of this resolution but want to ensure it would not be abused.

Besides ethics, what would prevent the Viceroy from falsifying test results?

I suppose that proving decisively that the Viceroy (or whoever else is in charge of analyzing the tests) isn’t falsifying it would be difficult in any case. However, our Viceroy is supposed to be someone of unimpeachable conduct; anyone who would falsify test results obviously doesn’t qualify, and it would be easy to tell once the unqualified attorney began their work.

That’s what I meant by “besides ethics”: I know the Viceroy is supposed to be someone of unimpeachable conduct but the key word in your response and mine is “supposed to.” Matters in the executive in October didn’t go as they were supposed to; it is not hard to imagine a future judiciary not doing what they are supposed to.

What do you think about explicitly providing a clause for removal due to incompetence?

A Removal Clause does sound like a good idea, and I should have included that from the beginning. I’ll add that soon.

EDIT: Done.

  1. If the Viceroy’s vote is counted in a unanimous decision, then their bad attorney can never be taken down.

  2. If the Viceroy’s vote doesn’t count in a unanimous decision, then still all it takes is one bad apple to spoil the bunch.

  3. Bringing back up Abadong’s point, we can work to something along the lines of “Any Attorney that is currently a defendant in a criminal case or is deemed questionable by any Arbiter may be suspended up until a Conclave ruling proves them innocent of crimes and fit for duty.” Or something like that.

  4. Down the rabbit hole of mistrust, however, the issue of Arbiters’ integrity is questioned, and the potential issue of repeated questionability rulings could knock the Attorney out of action for a long time. Of course, we could introduce evidence, yadda yadda yadda, and make this process more difficult in exchange for protected against untrustworthiness.

  5. While I don’t have major objections to this system due to trust in our Conclave, I thought I should point this out to contribute my thoughts should this become required.

That is all.

1 and 2. What about changing it to at least 3/4 for removal? And/or having a clause V.2 that puts it in the hands of the legislature or executive?

  1. Definitely something along those lines. But how would you define “questionable”?

4 and 5. I’m simply applying this approach:
“Science may seem to challenge the comfortable power assumptions of other institutions, simply by subjecting them to detached scrutiny. Organized skepticism involves a latent questioning of certain bases of established routine, authority, [and] vested procedures” (https://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/students/envs_5110/merton_sociology_science.pdf).
That includes skepticism about my own devil’s advocacy.
Trust is delicate and the environment, in the short run, is a prime determinant of how much people trust each other (https://ncase.me/trust/). If we put such protections into the environment, we are implying we need them in the first place, and we may be undermining trust in the short run.

However, in the long run, it’s the people that determine the environment. It’s up in the air as to how we as a community define objectivity and where responsibility ultimately lies.

As for your first comment, I am of the opinion that a unanimous vote makes it of more grave importance, but I’m not entirely opposed to the idea of 3/4 vote. Putting it in the hands of the Magisterium or, especially, the Delegacy is entirely out of the question for me. It’s an internal Conclave affair, and if someone outside the Conclave wishes to provide the Conclave with evidence that some Attorney ought to be removed, they can do so by bringing it to the Viceroy or the Viceroy Designee. For your third point, “questionable” would be up to the discretion of the Arbiter in question.

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Thank you for your response. Now that you have made that point, I heartily agree that this should be a Conclave-only matter. A 3/4 supermajority would be less vulnerable to one bad apple, and much graver than a simple majority conviction. As the current policy seems to veer toward filling the bench more, it becomes more significant.

That sounds like a good definition. You might want to add a statement saying it’s on Arbiters discretion.

Does anyone else have anything to add to this?

I don’t but I say wait a bit to see if there are any last minute objections.

I would say go for it. It’s been here for almost a week with not a peep.

Sent from my SM-J327P using Tapatalk

I meant to comment here earlier but I suppose I forgot. I don’t know about a ban on Magisters becoming Attorneys. Admittedly, I’m a Magister serving concurrently as Chief Officer of Justice, and that’s kinda weird if I get to while the Attorneys aren’t. I don’t really see a source of legislative interference in the court?

The Delegate ban and Arbiter ban makes sense to me, though.

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I’m generally a fan of being lenient, and three is a nice number. Just big enough to give the feeling that people are trusted, just small enough to constantly remind people of the consequences of abusing that trust.

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You do have a point, three is an ok number. However, I think that being a defendant in a trial while being an attorney is inexcusable, and should be in a class of its own when it comes to ethical breaches, making it an immediate dismissal.

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To strip an attorney of their position solely for being brought to trial is an assumption of guilt, which is not what we want to see in a justice system. Instead, the stripping of the office ought to occur upon (and possibly as part of) sentencing.

As the debate period has passed, I, as the sponsor of this proposed Resolution, motion it to a vote.

Are you sure? Abadong and Atlae seem to have concerns.

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I meant to comment here earlier but I suppose I forgot. I don’t know about a ban on Magisters becoming Attorneys. Admittedly, I’m a Magister serving concurrently as Chief Officer of Justice, and that’s kinda weird if I get to while the Attorneys aren’t. I don’t really see a source of legislative interference in the court?

The Delegate ban and Arbiter ban makes sense to me, though.

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Mostly it’s there to prevent an imbalance of power where one person ends up in every branch of the government. Separation of powers is something that I take seriously (which you might say is a tad ironic, seeing as I am in 3 of the 4 branches) and although no loophole is visible to me now, one may become apparent to some ne’er-do-well in the future, so closing that hole early should be a priority.

Is there a second?

Seconded.

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I meant to comment here earlier but I suppose I forgot. I don’t know about a ban on Magisters becoming Attorneys. Admittedly, I’m a Magister serving concurrently as Chief Officer of Justice, and that’s kinda weird if I get to while the Attorneys aren’t. I don’t really see a source of legislative interference in the court?

The Delegate ban and Arbiter ban makes sense to me, though.

— End quote

Mostly it’s there to prevent an imbalance of power where one person ends up in every branch of the government. Separation of powers is something that I take seriously (which you might say is a tad ironic, seeing as I am in 3 of the 4 branches) and although no loophole is visible to me now, one may become apparent to some ne’er-do-well in the future, so closing that hole early should be a priority.

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I echo what Atlae said. I’m not really concerned at any potential influence Magisters could have, since they still have to argue in front of Arbiters who ultimately decide. I’m more concerned about how many qualified individuals there are for this position who is not already a Magister, Arbiter or Delegate. As such, I think it would be beneficial to allow Magisters to become Attorneys.