Good Tidings,
I respectfully request judicial review relating to a vote in the Magisterium on a constitutional amendment coming out of a closed session of the Foreign Policy Committee. This vote is regarding the automatic repeal of certain treaties. Did the Magisterium exceed its authority under the Standing Orders of the Magisterium, by originating a constitutional amendment from this closed session of the Foreign Policy Committee?
Arguments:
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According to Section IV, Clause 2, the Delegate or Provost can call a meeting of the Foreign Policy Committee to discuss treaty negotiations or declarations of war. This vote does not fit this narrow definition. While it is true that this involves treaties, the process of a constitutional amendment is primarily a general legislative function not a diplomatic negotiation or declaration of war.
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By using a closed session of the Foreign Policy Committee to propose a constitutional amendment, the Magisterium has brought this to vote without the usually open process. It is true that Clause 3 requires votes that come out of a closed session to be public, it is the hidden discussion of a constitutional amendment that is potentially illegal.
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The goals of the Magisterium could have been achieved through a more transparent and proper method; namely, directly repealing specific treaties via the standard procedure. If the Magisterium deems it proper for a constitutional amendment to be discussed in private, it should follow the process outlined in Clause 1.
Is it legal to use the Foreign Policy Committee under the Standing Orders to propose constitutional amendments when a specific procedure is provided elsewhere, providing that the Magisterium to vote on whether a matter warrants a closed session?