I apologize for the delay in answering. It’s been a busy week IRL, and this is the first chance I’ve had to sit down and write out my thoughts.
First, I want to address the legal perspective I’d bring to the Conclave if confirmed as an Arbiter. I’m very interested in law. I’m not a lawyer or a paralegal, but I’ve read real-world case law and can navigate a court ruling. I think my take on the ConCrisis best shows how I approach the law.
So, the ConCrisis. Honestly, coming from someone who spent many years in Lazarus, NationStates’ very own Balkans, it was one of the stupidest things I have ever seen or heard of in a GCR.
The Conclave’s position was simple. The Concordat contained no mechanism for repealing itself, so any amendment claiming to “repeal and replace” it was illegal and void. But the ruling itself concedes a crucial fact: the February 2020 Concordat was “introduced, passed, and ratified through the amendment process.” The Magisterium approved it, and the Citizenry ratified it by referendum, exactly as the Concordat prescribed at the time.
In other words, the Conclave didn’t really take issue with the process. Rather, it objected to the label. But a comprehensive rewrite, duly passed under the amendment process in force at the time, doesn’t become invalid just because it calls itself a “repeal and replace.” The ruling also never established that the 2019 Concordat limited how much an amendment could change, either.
To get around this and hold that a procedurally valid amendment is somehow unconstitutional, the Conclave had to assume an unwritten limit on the amendment power. In constitutional law, this is generally known as a “basic structure” doctrine: the idea that certain fundamental features of a constitution can’t be amended away. Some real-world courts take this view. In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), the Supreme Court of India ruled 7-6 that it could strike down any constitutional amendment that destroyed the constitution’s fundamental architecture. Other countries write the limit directly into the constitution’s text. Germany’s Basic Law contains an “eternity clause,” permanently forbidding any amendment that abolishes the nation’s core democratic and human rights principles.
The problem is that the Concordat had no equivalent provision. The Conclave didn’t point to anything in the actual text that established such a limitation. Instead, it derived one from an undefined concept of the “social contract.”
And that’s where the reasoning becomes particularly difficult to defend. The Conclave argued the social contract “demands rule of law, rather than acquiescence to the popular will.” Yet its conclusion relied on placing an unwritten superlegal principle above the amendment procedure. You can’t ground an argument in the rule of law while simultaneously disregarding the written rules in favor of restrictions that aren’t actually there. Rule of law means applying the rules that actually exist, not replacing it with whatever principles a court thinks ought to exist.
The argument that “no organ may act for another” falls into the same trap. The Concordat itself spelled out which bodies had to approve an amendment, and those bodies consented. Requiring additional organs to ratify an amendment effectively adds another condition to the amendment process. A requirement found nowhere in the text. That’s legislating from the bench, plain and simple.
Even setting all of that aside, the remedy was wildly disproportionate. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the words “repeals and replaces” did exceed the amendment power. The obvious remedy would have been to sever those words, while upholding the rest of the amendment. Instead, the Conclave voided more than two years of constitutional amendments and cast doubt on every law and election since.
And then there’s perhaps the most troubling part: the ruling concluded that the only fully legitimate institution left in the region was the Conclave itself, specifically the three Arbiters who signed the decision. Any court that interprets a constitution in a way that leaves itself as the sole surviving legitimate institution should expect extensive scrutiny from the region.
​That’s ultimately the approach I’d bring to the Conclave. Read the text for what it actually says, respect the procedures the region agreed to, and don’t reach for a broader remedy than the situation requires. An Arbiter’s job is to interpret and apply the law. That’s it. It’s not to rewrite the law because they disagree with the outcome those laws produce.