Trade-offs of Political Oppression
Cillian PalanianPeople underestimate the financial cost of the security apparatus that the Packilvanian government uses to maintain political stability in the country and keep the Bedonite dynasty in power. But, we often underestimate how in choosing to dedicate resources on security many elements of social support and institutional development have remained compromised and undermine the very ends of the securitisation of the state: state stability and continued Bedonite rule. Ironically, it also leaves the Bedonite dynasty well positioned to destroy itself and the country through infighting and the lack of adequate structures to manage the fall out due to a lack of checks and balances.
On a per capita basis, experts estimate that Packilvania has the most CCTV cameras in the world. Last year, at his budget vote speech, Prince Lohadek, the Minister of State Security celebrated the installation of tens of millions of state managed and operated CCTV cameras. These cameras are procured from domestic producers of security equipment. However, they must be accompanied by investments into repair and replacement which the government largely outsources to third party contractors. Given the lack of transparency around how the tenders for these are awarded and the lack of accountability for political and senior security officials, it is likely that the vast CCTV infrastructure of Packilvania is of poor quality and little practical utility.
These deficiencies are compounded by the fact that tens of thousands of agents of the Cyber and Telecommunications Security Agency must be devoted to simply looking through footage and identifying potential threats to public order and safety. With billions of hours of footage and too few staff to have eyes on all of them, it is basically impossible to have eyes on everything happening in the country. As a result, leaked documents from the CTSA state that the government prioritises high security threat areas.
This is followed by the immense data space required to store the billions of hours of footage that has sometimes led to footage from places that are not high security priorities being deleted after a period lapses, rendering the value of having CCTV cameras useless. The government has attempted to mitigate these factors by having tech companies create artificial intelligence and big data models capable of extracting meaningful value from the immense footage from the CCTV camera network. However, the government has been duped by snake oil salesmen selling extremely inaccurate and unreliable software that has largely scuppered the promise of the program. So severe, was this issue that the Department of State Security has attempted to seize control of procurement of this technology and put the big tech giants of Packilvania to work on this.
Unfortunately for the state, building expertise in this space has been tricky and the tech giants have relied on models and technologies from foreign nations including from private security and tech contractors from its supposed political rivals such as FPS, Norgsveldet and South Hills. This has created a gaping hole in the security apparatus of the government that is open for exploitation or being undermined by foreign governments.
The extent of these challenges is not a myth either. In the early 2000s, massive protests broke out in Fidakar after a police officer murdered a minor. These protests not only showed the anger that the people had toward the state for its atrocious handling of the incident but their frustration at the culture within the broader security and political apparatus that enabled this situation to arise. Through grassroots activism and social organisation, millions managed to get onto the streets and force the government to significantly reform the running of Fidakar. The government granted many of these concessions proving that even a tyrannical dictatorship as feared as that of the Sultans is capable of reform with enough social pressure.
This incident was such a massive security disaster for the Bedonite dynasty that it has spent the past two decades attempting to erase it from public memory through banning books and publications, arresting people and destroying any evidence. Unfortunately for them, they cannot erase the event from the minds of those who were there and who observed the outcomes thereof.
Another province has been brewing with malcontent for sometime. In Iganar, the richest province in the country, the government has struggled to curtail the operations of gangs of men who perpetrate violent crime in the name of Ultra conservative Paxists religious ideology. To the chagrin of the state, many of their members are embedded in clerical structures and they occupy gradiants of both the intensity of action and independence from the clergy. This makes it difficult to disentangle these groups from the religious structures and isolate them and destroy them. This is especially problematic given that Iganar is the birthplace of the celebrity Magister. These are highly influential Magisters with massive followings and pop-culture appeal who leave semi-independent operations as heads of organisations that operate independently from the Magisterium in various social and religious spheres, a practice that the Magisterium is reluctant to stop.
Given that, these Magisters are powerful figures with wealth who use these violent gangs to settle disputes, depose rivals, and control their following. These are de facto gangsters whom the government is struggling to control due to its close relationship with the Magisterium and the Magisteriumâs reluctance to investigate and address these issues in any significant detail.
The actions by the Governors following Sultan Thumim Vâs wedding through their open rebellion shows Just how much disputes in the Imperial House have ramifications for the rest of the country. While, Sultan Thumim V has attempted to project the image that he is in charge by removing these governors and other officials who supported them, the fact that many ministers from his fatherâs era still keep their jobs even a year into his reign demonstrates that he is balancing the stability of the family with his own agenda. It has been almost 1 and half years since his attempted assassination and we have no convictions and no names. Prince Kujil was arrested, but since then nothing has been heard and no other Prince or truly senior official has being brought to book despite the fact that it is obvious he could not have possibly acted alone. The military made a show of arresting some low level officials but come on, be serious! It is highly unlikely that this incredible operation was a solo gig.
In conclusion the Packilvanian security situation is a complete mess, and it is totally unstable. Well organised and well connected forces have the ability to undermine and potentially upend the whole show.