Today, I would like to respond into a particularly interesting point in Aivintis’ article, “The Role of the Conclave”: in particular, the undemocratic aspect of it. I will explore this point by arguing what exactly the article means by an undemocratic Conclave, how the words “exclusive “ and “undemocratic “ are used to define the Conclave, and finally, how the concept of the undemocratic Conclave is used in the article to serve its greater thesis: that of the useless Conclave. I argue that the article, fundamentally, aims to vilify the Conclave and cause a shift of discourse against it.
Let us first understand: how does the article call the Conclave undemocratic? To begin with, we must first centre our argument to the Conclave as a Constitutional Court, for it is in this talking point where the major points of democracy exists. The first use of the word “undemocratic” comes with the mention of the ConCrisis, a governmental crisis where members of the Conclave ruled the passage of the 2019 Concordat to be illegal, because it contained the intent to repeal and replace the previous Concordat. This previous Concordat did not have any mechanism for any descendant Concordats to exist, and so the Conclave ruled accordingly. Interestingly, the use of the word “undemocratic” came in conjunction with the word “exclusivity”, in essence: “undemocratic exclusivity”.
Now, word choice is particularly important here. When the article covers the ConCrisis, it creates a dichotomy between “popular community will”, as the article puts it, and the “undemocratic exclusive Conclave”. This can be seen in the paragraph before the ConCrisis, where the Conclave was characterised as a “far less democratic and inclusive place than the Magisterium”, and the paragraph after, where the article mentions the aftermath: “When the democratic will got a chance to speak again, on the reconfirmation of the Arbiters, they were rejected in favor of new applicants.” It is evident here that within the context of the article, the Conclave were undemocratic, and the people who removed them from power, democratic.
From here, it is clear: the words democratic and undemocratic are largely used as organising devices: concepts with which to classify the two sides of the ConCrisis: the people, and the Conclave. It is, in truth, a deeply powerful organising device: democracy has been the major system of government for the past few decades now, and allowed for the removal of a tyrannical regime. In that sense, the “undemocratic exclusive Conclave” can be assume to be a form of a tyrannical regime, someone who has destroyed the fabric of our government. Hurray for all.
But then, we must ask ourselves the question: why was the Conclave painted in this light in the first place? Why are they characterized as “undemocratic” and “exclusive”? The article makes little mention of this, and as such we must enter the realm of interpretation in light of its context: the government. The government of TEP has four main branches of government: the Executive, the Magisterium, the Conclave, and the Praesidium. One useful way by which we can classify these branches would be how they admit their members, as that can illuminate the “exclusive” matter.
Out of the four branches of government, the Conclave has the least amount of inclusivity. In order to gain membership as an Arbiter, a prospective applicant must:
- Get the trust of the community;
- Wait for an Arbiter to no longer keep their term, either through retirement or expulsion;
- Be nominated by the Delegate;
- Be confirmed via majority vote by the Magisterium,
- and have good legal insight and knowledge for TEP.
This, therefore, is the crux of why the article calls the Conclave “exclusive”: gaining membership requires the trust of both the Magisterium and the Delegate, as well as the legal insight necessary for the position. We can therefore conclude from this that the exclusivity of the Conclave comes from the difficulty of obtaining membership.
Now that exclusive is out of the way, let us understand “undemocratic”. Here, we return back to the article, because it is useful to see how the article handles being “democratic” and “undemocratic”. As I have mentioned prior, the first use of the word “democratic” is used in the paragraph preceding the ConCrisis. In the interest of referring to it, I shall quote the relevant passage:
“Furthermore, I ask: Do we want less things for our legislature to do? As Thaecia has discovered, there is only so much a legislature can do. Delegating clarification to a Conclave which legislates from the bench – especially as a far less democratic and inclusive body than the Magisterium – only takes the opportunity of participation away from members of our region. Of course, Thaecia suffered more than we might, as it was a legislature-centric region and we are Executive-centric, but it would be nice to have more activity in the legislature as well.”
Emphasis mine. The most telling detail of this passage would be what it compares the undemocratic Conclave to: that is, the Magisterium. We can extrapolate from this that, in reality, the democracy that the article is referring to revolves around the Magisterium, which can be supported by the other mention of democracy: “When the democratic will got a chance to speak again, on the reconfirmation of the Arbiters, they were rejected in favor of new applicants.” As previously mentioned, the Magisterium are the ones who confirm the Arbiters, which means this passage also refers to them. If we take into account the aforementioned dichotomy between the “community will” and the Conclave, we can very easily replace community will with the Magisterium in order to further clarify what undemocratic is really used for: as a contrast to the democratic Magisterium. To summarize, the reason why the Conclave was labeled undemocratic is because it stood in opposition to the democratic, the Magisterium.
Why does this, then, matter? It matters because following the ConCrisis, several pieces of legislation have been passed limiting the Conclave’s powers: first, the Conclave can no longer overturn any part of the Concordat, and second, the Conclave may only pass specific types of Orders, with all other types being subject to acceptance by the Magisterium. These represent a pushback against the Conclave, which is further represented by the article. Understanding why the Conclave is being painted as undemocratic and exclusive requires us to understand the ConCrisis as well, because that fundamentally it where it all started. It is very telling that the article explicitly calls the Conclave as Constitutional Court as not just useless, but a threat to our government, for being not easily accessible as well as being able to interpret the laws. Because in truth, that is one of the core arguments of the article: that the ability for the Conclave to interpret and interfere with the legislature of the East Pacific is too strong, and should be left in the hands of the people, the Magisterium:
"If the worst case scenario is the near-annihilation of our regional government and community, and the best case scenario is that we save a few weeks of work, work which we might want anyway in order to fuel activity within the region and give newer Magisters easier tasks to do, there is no need for the Constitutional court within the government of The East Pacific. "
Despite the end paragraph of the article, it clearly argues for the abolishment of the Conclave, as it is useless. It argues that it is replaceable, that its powers can be split between the other three branches with little explanation as to how. It treats the Conclave as though it is some kind of shadow organization, where its members have the ability to overturn any law in sight, even though it fundamentally is a reactionary body. Through its description of the Conclave as undemocratic, the article labels the Conclave as a threat, the Other, the separate entity of the government. It even says this explicitly: “However, I do see it as a largely vestigial body, one whose roles can be split between the other three branches with equal balance of power fairly easily.” It creates the discourse of a polarized world, a world where it was either us or them. And I do not believe that that is a world we live in.
The article forgets to mention a key aspect of the Conclave: that as part of a system of checks and balances. It almost leaves it out of the question entirely, especially when characterizing it as a vestigial body at the very end. And that is the article’s weakest point. Because it doesn’t matter that the Praesidium does not act and arrest without evidence. What matters is ensuring that the reason for that arrest is both valid and true. It does not matter that Election Complaints are far and few between. What matters is that there is a forum for that, as well as a body that ensures the integrity of the election. It does not matter that the Magisterium always amends laws according to the Judicial Review. What matters is ensuring that the laws are in accordance to the Concordat, that the laws are explicit in its intentions, that the laws will always, always help the people, the very people this government serves. There is only one branch of government that can do this, that can be impartial enough to look at the action in front of them, while also ensuring that it is in accordance to the will of the people. That, is the Conclave. The final court of appeal.
Sources:
Aivintis (2024). The Role of the Conclave. Retrieved from NationStates | Dispatch | The Role of the Conclave [ZML]